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1. Introduction
On 22 June 2013 the Bank of England concluded a Rmb200bn. (US$32.6bn.) 
currency swap agreement with the Peoples Bank of China in order ‘to pro-
mote bilateral trade between the two countries and to support domestic 
financial stability should market conditions warrant’ (Bank of England 
2013; Noble 2013). This is the first such agreement with a G7 economy and 
highlights the manner in which China is promoting the international use of 
its currency through a series of bi-lateral arrangements. These are central 
to a broad strategy aimed at increasing the use of the Rmb in trade settle-
ments, central bank reserves and bond issues. This seeks to build on China’s 
advantages in terms of share of world trade, long-term economic growth, 
credit worthiness and increasing importance as a source of investment and 
loans. Further advantage stems from the manner in which the highly man-
aged Rmb with its link to the US$, has shown itself to be extremely stable, 
but with a gradual appreciation (34% since 2005), which makes it attractive 
to hold.[1]  Against this, the strategy has to navigate around the lack of Rmb 
convertibility, the still closely controlled Chinese capital regime, and the small 
and embryonic nature of its domestic financial markets, which conventional 
views see as major barriers to successful currency internationalisation.[2] 
In addition, China has to persuade the world to accept a new international 
currency, displacing established ones, notably, the US$. Which in turn brings 
both the prospect of American opposition and the broader question of the 
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rise of China as a major global power into the 
equation. Thus, for many observers the moves 
to internationalise the Rmb is part of China’s 
long-term aim of displacing both the dollar 
and the US positions in the global system. 
However, whatever China’s long-term goals, 
in seeking to understand the motivation for 
the internationalisation of the Rmb, it is not 
necessary to go beyond the economic dis-
advantages that China is experiencing from 
the limited use of its currency.   
This paper reviews the motives, advantages 
and constraints that China faces, the interna-
tionalising strategy that has been adopted, 
its success to date, and the likely outcome.
2. Motives for Rmb internationalisation
The extremely limited international use of the 
Rmb contrasts sharply with China’s share of 
global trade and output, particular when com-
pared to the positions occupied by the USA 
and the US$ (Table 1). The current situation 
significantly disadvantages China, particu-
larly with respect to trade, where the limited 
use of the Rmb markedly increases the costs 
of transactions. This results from the need to 
hold reserves of foreign currency in order to 
meet cross-border obligations, with the attend-
ant problems of uncertainly over exchange 
rate movements. In contrast, the USA with 
virtually all its trade denominated in US$, 
has no such problems and can, if necessary, 
print more of its currency to meet settlements. 
The limits on the use of the Rmb also create 
mismatches and uncertainties on China’s 
international balance sheet. The results from 
the extent to which its liabilities are denomi-
nated in Rmb while its foreign claims are in 
other currencies, dominantly the US$. This 
heavy dependence on the US$ has become a 
source of concern to China, particularly with 
the onset of the global financial crisis. This 
raised the prospects of US$ instability and 
loss of confidence in American bond markets, 
with consequent adverse impacts on China’s 
trade costs and, even more, the value of its 
reserves. Concerns that have continued with 
speculation that the USA might attempt to 
improve its competitive position and reduce 
its levels of debt by currency depreciation 
and/or promotion of domestic inflation. These 
fears have so far proved groundless, and the 
American currency and bond markets have 
weathered the crisis remarkably well. Indeed, 
even the loss of one of its triple ‘A’ ratings did 
little to disturb the situation, with subsequent 
40% appreciation of the US$ and increased 
financial in-flows. This, it can be argued, 
particularly in the context of the on-going 
problems of the Eurozone, reflects the lack of 
any safer or more liquid haven for funds.[3] 
However, the crisis set alarm bells ring-
ing for Chinese policy makers and there 
is no doubt that they would like to reduce 
exposure to the USA’s currency and policies. 
While initially proposing (with the other 
BRICS) that the US$ should be replaced by 
a new reserve currency, a suggestion that 
gained little traction, they subsequently 
moved to the vigorous promotion of the 
use of the Rmb (section 6). However, this 
brings the Rmb face to face with the US$. 
3. The embedded US$
In internationalising its currency China faces 
the extent to which the US$ is embedded in 
the international system at almost every level.
[4] While it has become increasingly fashion-
able to predict the decline of the US$ as part of 
a general eclipse of the global position of the 
USA,[5] it remains the international currency 
for pricing and measuring of value for almost 
every major commodity, international report-
ing, statistical compilation, trade, exchange 
rate anchor and store of wealth. It is also by 
far the most available currency in the global 
system.[6] However, the dominant role of the 
US$ has increasingly reflected inertia as the 
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relative position of the USA in global trade, 
credit, investment and growth has declined.
[7] That is, to a considerable extent the US$ 
is used because it is used and new actors in 
the global system become socialised into its 
norms, which include: trading in US$ because 
others do, even when this does not involve the 
USA; stabilising ones currency against the US$ 
even when the USA is not the dominant trad-
ing partner because by doing so the currency 
is stabilised against all those other currencies 
that also stabilise against the US$;[8] paying 
for commodities in US$ because that is the 
currency that they are priced in; and holding 
reserves in US$ because it makes sense to hold 
reserves in the same currency as debts are 
denominated and trade settled.[9] A critical 
factor in all of this is what might be called 
the ‘petro-dollar’ regime, with the continuing 
rapid increase in demand for oil and a mas-
sive (and highly speculative) futures market, 
ensuring an ever expanding demand for the 
US$. A situation that the USA has sought to 
maintain with vigorous opposition to any 
moves to shift away from US$ oil pricing.
It must also be stressed that this persist-
ence of US$ use does in many cases reflect 
significant geostrategic considerations with 
respect to the USA (Posen 2008: 86-95). There 
is no doubt that these have played a part in 
limiting the challenges to the US$ posed by 
other currencies, notably the Yen and the 
German Mark during the 1980s, and more 
recently the Euro.[10] Though it should be 
stressed that there has been a tendency to 
overestimate the ability of the challeng-
ers to internationalise their currency while 
underestimating the continuing strength of 
the USA and its currency (Pollard 2001: 29). 
However, despite the continuing strength 
of the US$, since 2001 there has been some 
reduction in its use in reserves and trade set-
tlements, most significantly as a result of the 
establishment of the Euro, but also because 
of the increased use of such currencies as the 
Yen, Sterling and the Australian and Canadian 
dollars (see Table 2 and comments below). 
However, that the US$ has so far maintained 
its broader financial position (as noted in Sec-
tion 1) is illustrated by share of international 
bond market and foreign exchange trading 
(Table 2). Indeed, the extent to which the US$ 
has maintained its position in the face of the 
establishment of the Euro as a major interna-
tional currency (Table 1) tends to underline the 
extent of the embedding and inertia. It calls 
into question the many predictions that the 
Euro would rapidly come to supplant the glo-
bal position of the US$.[11] While this tends 
to highlight the challenges that China faces in 
internationalising the Rmb, the position of the 
Euro does reflect the capacity of the interna-
tional system to accommodate more than one 
major currency (see comments in Section 6).
The decline in US$ share of foreign 
exchange reserves, and the gains of the Euro 
have been most marked in emergent and 
developing economies (Table 2). However, 
the changes do need to be understood in 
the context of exchange rate shifts, revi-
sions to the way the IMF calculates reserves 
and the partial nature of the data, which 
almost certainly under-estimates the role of 
the US$, particularly in emergent markets 
which have become the principle drivers of 
global reserve accumulation.[12] It is also 
important to stress that the decline shown 
in Table 2 was from a peak of US$ holdings 
and currency valuation, and the 2012 position 
remains well above that of the mid-1990s.[13] 
A more significant decline in US$ use 
appears to have taken pace in trade set-
tlements, however data remains far from 
comprehensive and should be viewed with 
caution (ECB 2009: 36; Kamps 2006: 7; Otero-
Iglesias 2011).[14] During the late 1990s 
the US$ may have accounted for as much 
as 53% of settlements compared to 30% for 
the legacy currencies of the initial Eurozone 
members (Papademos 2008; Pollard 2001: 2). 
By the end of 2012 the relative position had 
shifted to US$ 31.7% and Euro 39.7%.[15]  
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On the basis of the 2012 data, the use of the 
Euro has come to match and even exceed the 
Eurozone and wider EU shares of global trade 
(Table 1). However, both the trade share and 
the use of the Euro are heavily concentrated 
within the EU itself (ECB 2009; Goldberg 2005; 
Kamps 2006; Auboin 2012: 9). While there has 
been some major replacement of the US$ in 
both intra- and extra-Eurozone/EU trade,[16] 
significant amounts of external trade con-
tinued to be invoiced in other currencies, 
principally US$. In 2012 62.5% Eurozone 
exports of goods were invoiced in Euros and 
49.0% of imports – a major factor in the latter 
was oil, only 12% of which was paid for in 
Euros (ECB 2013: 28-29). In contrast, the USA 
is able to denominate over 90% of its trade in 
US$, which, unlike the Euro, is also widely 
used in transactions that do not involve the 
USA (Auboin 2012; ECB 2013: 76-79; Goldberg 
and Tille 2009). Thus, despite its reduced share 
of trade settlements, the US$ continues to be 
substantially more internationalised than the 
Euro. A crude measure of this can be obtained 
by dividing the global proportion of use in 
trade settlements by the export share. Using 
the figures contained in Table 1 this brings 
out very sharply the difference between the 
Euro (EU 1.1 Eurozone 1.4) and US$ (3.8).[17] 
While a significant proportion of US$ ‘third 
country trade’ relates to US$-priced commodi-
ties, with major producers invoicing virtually 
all their exports in US$, it also involves much 
general invoicing of trade. This has been par-
ticularly well documented within East, South 
East and Southern Asia, where Kamps (2006: 
43-47) study of nine countries found that of 
83.3% of exports were invoiced in US$.[18] 
Similar levels have been cited by a number 
of other studies (Auboin 2012: 9; ECB 2009; 
Goldberg and Tille 2009: 16; Nakonieczna-
Kisiell 2009). Even Japan invoices a significant 
amounts of its exports in US$, not least within 
Asia (Table 3). In all these cases the use of the 
US$ for exports payments greatly exceeds the 
proportion of their trade that goes to the USA. 
In Thailand, for example, 80% of trade was 
settled in US$ during 2011, but only 9.5% of 
trade involved the USA. Thus, in trade settle-
ment terms, Asia may be regarded as a ‘dollar 
zone’ with the use of the currency being 
backed by US strategic interests and long-term 
alliances. In consequence, while given China’s 
increasing domination of Asian trade and pro-
duction (see Section 5) there is considerable 
scope for replacing the US$ with the Rmb, this 
is already engendering significant concern on 
the part of the USA (see Sections 6 and 7). 
The problems for China that result from the 
incumbency of the US$ are compounded by 
the extent to which China is heavily depend-
ent on the stability of the USA’s currency 
and financial markets. For given the level 
of its US$ holdings (some 70% of reserves) 
and heavy use of US$s in trade settlement, 
notably for energy imports, any moves that 
destabilized the US$ would be seriously 
damaging for China. A situation that might be 
exacerbated by retaliatory moves on the part 
of the USA (see comments in Section 7). Thus, 
in seeking to engineer any shifts to the Rmb 
and away from the US$, China has to tread 
very carefully as well as having to navigate 
around its own domestic constraints resulting 
from continuing currency and capital controls.
4. The persistence of Chinese 
currency and capital controls
The liberalisation of controls over access to the 
currency or cross-border capital movements is 
proceeding cautiously, even by Chinese stand-
ards. This reflects the extent to which control 
over domestic investment remains integral to 
the Chinese mode of development. Essentially, 
the financial system centres on the channelling 
of domestic saving and state funds though 
the banking system. Such a situation could be 
very significantly disrupted by rapid financial 
liberalisation that facilitated, for example, 
the growth of domestic bond markets that 
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diverted savings away from bank depos-
its, or large-scale cross-border flows. Deep 
seated concern over the latter largely explains 
continuation of controls over capital move-
ments and cross-border Rmb transactions. 
Uncontrolled use of the Rmb could well lead 
to substantial circumnavigation of the capital 
regulations through ‘over-invoicing’. Indeed, 
there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that significant leakage of capital does take 
place despite the controls (see also Section 6). 
China has also taken on board the les-
sons of Japan’s attempt during the 1980s to 
internationalise its currency through rapid 
liberalisation, notably the abrupt removal 
of the long-standing currency controls 
in1982 and revaluing the yen. This not only 
failed to significantly promote the use of 
the yen, but also played a significant role 
in the property bubble and crash which 
ushered in the so-called Japanese ‘lost dec-
ades’ (see for example ECB 2012: 42-45). 
Essentially, Chinese policy makers are 
concerned that any rapid liberalisation runs 
the risk of importing instability and under-
mining development policies and priorities. 
Such concerns have been significantly rein-
forced since 2007, as Chinese controls largely 
insulated the economy from the direct impact 
of the financial crisis while facilitating both 
managing the currency in order to maintain 
exports and directing the banks to increase 
lending. Subsequently, the benefits of the 
cross-border controls were further demon-
strated by the large-scale, and potentially 
highly destabilising, financial outflows from 
the Western economies that resulted from 
quantitative easing, particularly by the USA. 
In the absence of controls such flows could 
have been particularly problematic for China, 
given that there were already significant asset 
bubbles and rapid expansion of unregulated 
shadow banking. These  resulted from China’s 
general investment policy and bank regula-
tion, but were exacerbated by the massive 
stimulation of the economy (equivalent of 14% 
of GDP) that successfully offset the 2008-9 
collapse of export markets. Finally, the con-
tinuing global economic uncertainly, which 
some see as heralding a long period of low 
growth and recurrent crisis, particularly for 
the Western economies (the ‘New Normal’), 
give China further reason to be cautious.
5. Chinese advantages
In terms of promotion of the use of its cur-
rency China has the advantage, not only its 
economic strength, the stability of the Rmb 
and extent of trading activities, as already 
noted, but also of its increasingly central 
place in the complex East and South East 
Asian regional production system.[19] Within 
this, China has become not only the princi-
ple trading partner and the major driver of 
growth and integration, but also the region’s 
most important interface with the rest of 
the global system. China is also becoming 
a major provider of investment and credit 
for all the countries involved in the produc-
tion system, as well as establishing currency 
swap arrangements with their central banks.
[20] Increasingly, China’s fortunes are also 
those of the regional production system. This 
position gives China some significant lever-
age to persuade countries to adopt the Rmb 
in trade settlements. A similar argument 
can be made with respect to China’s spread-
ing trade network in the rest of the Global 
South, a development that is also becom-
ing heavily supported by investment and 
credit provisions that offer alternatives to the 
international agencies and Western donors. 
China is also advantaged by some sig-
nificant anti-USA / IMF / US$ sentiments in 
much of the Global South. Something that 
has been added to since 2007 by the America 
origins of the crisis, direct impact on emergent 
economies in particular, and views that quan-
titative easing has been implemented with no 
regard for its impact outside of the USA.[21]  
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Indeed, lead by the BRICS, there has been 
much criticism of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ 
that the USA extracts from the position of its 
currency, not least with respect to lowering 
the cost of trade and borrowing.[22] However, 
for many of the countries concerned, whatever 
their feelings towards the USA and its cur-
rency, the advantages that might result from 
a shift to the Rmb, would have to be weighed 
against damaging relations with the USA, 
particularly with respect to security. There is 
also the issue of the extent to which countries 
might be happy to increase their depend-
ence on China and its economic fortunes.
6. Chinese strategy and progress  
to date
Significant and coordinated promotion of the 
use of the Rmb dates from July 2009. This 
took the form of a pilot involving selected 
‘trusted’ traders in five Chinese cities who 
were allowed to establish Rmb settlements 
with counterparts in Hong Kong, Macau and 
ASEAN. This was subsequently expanded 
(in June 2010) to 20 cities and in August 2011 
to all parts of China. Developments that 
were accompanied by a series of bilateral 
agreements over the use of Rmb in trade set-
tlements.[23] These have variously facilitated 
invoicing in Rmb and the currencies of some 
key trading partners (notably Japan and Rus-
sia), and direct exchange of currencies. While 
such agreements are concentrated in East and 
South East Asia, they are spreading rapidly 
throughout the Chinese trading network. 
Particularly significant are the arrangements 
with Australia, Brazil, Japan, Russia and 
Germany. The latter agreement reached in 
June 2010 saw the portion of German-China 
trade settled in Rmb increase from 2.4% to 
8.4% by May 2013. However, it is the agree-
ments with Russia (because of the scale of oil 
and gas transactions) and Japan (with 25% of 
trade going to China) that have the potential 
to massively expand the use of the Rmb and 
significantly reduce the use of the US$.[24] 
The whole process of Rmb promotion 
is being reinforced by: the extent to which 
Chinese investment and credit provision is 
following trade agreements; arrangements 
between the Bank of China and the central 
banks of over 20 trading partners to exchange 
Rmb for US$ on demand; the realisation 
amongst countries (and individual traders) 
that they will get more advantageous terms if 
they agree to settle in Rmb; the development 
of the international Chinese banking network 
which facilitates payment through local banks; 
and the related moves by China to establish 
a very rapid (and low-cost) post-trade Rmb 
settlement system.[25] The latter has also to be 
seen as part of moves by the ASEAN+3 group 
to establish such a system in East and South 
East Asia, that also makes the maximum use 
of local currencies (ASEAN 2013; Chan 2013).
Given the concerns over uncontrolled 
currency trading and bond issues noted 
above (Section 4), China has opted to promote 
these activities offshore. Again proceed-
ing in a gradual manner through a series of 
bi-lateral agreements which permitted trad-
ing and bond issues. The process started in 
Hong Kong in 2007 with issues by selected 
mainland financial institutions was opened 
to Chinese and foreign companies in 2010 
and then spread gradually to Malaysia, 
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, 
London and France (by November 2013). 
Issues have been made in Hong Kong and 
London by Banco de Brazil, the Australia 
and New Zealand Bank and such compa-
nies as Volkswagen and Tesco (HSBC 2013: 
15). While the bonds have been purchased 
by South Korea, South Africa, Indonesia, 
Thailand and a number of African countries, 
including Nigeria, reflecting the number 
of central banks that are coming to hold a 
small proportion of their reserves in Rmb or 
Rmb denominated bonds (HSBC 2013: 15). 
As with trade settlement, the holding of 
	 The	Internationalisation	of	the	Renminbi	(Rmb)	 7
Rmb reserves has been promoted by bilateral 
agreements. At the time of writing (November 
2013), the most important of these is with 
Australia (April 2013) which agreed to move 
5% of reserves into Chinese bonds.[26] This 
increased willingness to hold Rmb reserves 
reflects both increasing use in trade and the 
related establishment of currency swaps. By 
November 2013 swap agreements had been 
signed with some 25 countries.[27] A further 
sign of the increased importance of the Rmb 
is the switch of seven major Asia currencies 
from tracking the US$ to tracking the Rmb 
(including Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea 
and Thailand), leaving only three on the US$ 
track (Hong Kong, Mongolia and Vietnam).
The Chinese strategy does appear to be 
resulting in some remarkable increases in 
the use of the Rmb (Auboin 2012: 15). From 
a situation in 2008 when only a handful of 
neighbouring countries made any use of the 
Rmb in cross-border and domestic transac-
tions, by May 2013 160 countries paid some 
part of their China trade in Rmb, 47 of them 
paying for more than 10% (compared to 29 in 
May 2012) - with some individually strikingly 
high levels, notably Singapore (30%), the Gulf 
States (38%) and Taiwan (44%; Nicholova 
2013). Overall, 11.4% of Chinese trade was 
settled in Rmb, compared to 2.5% in mid-
2010 and near zero in mid-2009 (Rhee and 
Lea 2013: 10).[28] In addition, the Rmb share 
of foreign exchange transactions increased 
from 0.9% in April 2010 to 2.2% in April 2013 
(BIS 2013). More striking is the increased 
use of the Rmb in traditional trade finance, 
Letters of Credit and Collectables (this is of 
course only one element of trade settlements). 
Between January 2012 and October 2013 the 
Rmb share increased from 1.89% to 8.66%, 
overtaking the Euro (6.64%), though mak-
ing little impression on the domination of 
the US$ (81.08%; SWIFT November 2013c).
While the speed of change is quite remark-
able, it must be kept in perspective. For 
although between January 2012 and May 2013  
the Rmb share of global trade settlements 
increased more than threefold, moving it from  
the 20th most used currency to the 13th – 
overtaking the Danish Kroner and the Russian 
Rouble, the increase was from 0.25% to 0.84% 
of global trade settlements.[29] In addition, 
there may well be some exaggeration of the  
use of the Rmb because of the issue of Rmb 
letters of credit which are used to raise 
offshore funds rather than make trade settle-
ments. Similarly, some firms are believed to 
capitalise on the differences in the onshore 
and offshore values of the Rmb (known 
respectively as the Rmb CNY and the Rmb 
CNH), exchanging these in Hong Kong 
and then converting them to US$ for use in 
trade settlements. Both of these activities 
are essentially exploiting gaps in the capital 
controls framework (HSBC 2013: 10, 26). 
This may go even further, with suggestions 
of both significant over-invoicing (Financial 
Times 20 June 2013) and even dummy cor-
porations being set up to channel funds.
7. Prospects for success
China’s approach in the internationalisation 
of its currency has involved some signifi-
cant innovation. This is enabling it to make 
some impressive progress while retaining a 
largely closed financial system with limited 
convertibility. The critical question is how far 
can current Chinese strategy take the Rmb? 
On present trends it could overtake Sterling 
by 2015-16 to become the third most used 
currency. Such increased use being heavily 
concentrated within the East and South East 
Asian regional production system, where the 
high levels of intra-firm trade may engender 
both a degree of ‘third country’ use and the 
prospect of the Rmb regional currency. Such 
expansion of trade use being accompanied by 
related, but rather less significant, increases 
in Rmb reserve holdings. However, even the 
overtaking of Sterling would involve some 
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major displacement of the US$, the deep 
imbedding of which in the international sys-
tem is reinforced by inertia of users, supported 
by the USA’s long-term strategic interests 
and alliances, and outright opposition to 
any threat to the Dollar’s hegemony.[30] 
Factors that in various combinations have 
served to limit past challenges to the US$ 
and whose on-going strength it would be 
dangerous to underestimate. Undoubtedly, 
any prospect of significant US$ displace-
ment, particularly by the Rmb would provoke 
significant opposition by the USA. A response 
that has also to be seen in the context of 
the USA’s anxiety over China’s increasing 
economic power and influence, particularly 
in Asia and the Global South as whole, and 
concerns that other countries might seek to 
emulate a Chinese currency challenge.[31]
So far the opposition of the USA’s govern-
ment, financial sector and corporate sector 
as a whole, to the internationalisation of 
the Rmb, remains at the level of rhetoric 
and non-participation. This is reflected in 
the failure to expand the use of the Rmb in 
trade settlements[32] and the lack of any 
moves to establish trading of Rmb and Rmb 
denominated bonds within the USA. There is, 
however, significant concern over the various 
Chinese bilateral agreements that threaten to 
increase the use of the Rmb at the expense of 
the US$, notably those with Russia and Japan.
[33] Since early-2012 there has been increas-
ing reference by US commentators to the 
emergence of a ‘dollar exclusion zone’ in Asia 
and concern that agreements with Argentina, 
Brazil, and Venezuela signify that this has 
‘crossed the Pacific’.[34] While as yet none 
of this has made any significant inroads into 
the US$’s use, the general tone suggests that 
the USA may attempt to forestall shifts away 
from the US$ by establishing agreements with 
trading partners that reinforce the present 
position. It could be, for example, that the pro-
posed Trans-Pacific Partnership might be used 
as a vehicle for locking countries into US$ 
denominated trade. A proposal that is already 
playing on the unease that many Asian 
countries feel over their heavy economic 
dependence on China and what many see as 
its increasingly assertive foreign policies.
While China may be able to continue the 
rapid expansion of trade settlements (what-
ever the US opposition) and the much more 
gradual increase in the use of the Rmb in 
reserves and bond issues, it is difficult to see 
how this will make any significant dent in the 
US financial markets or the reserve position 
of the US$ in the immediate future.[35] For 
this would necessitate a massive expansion 
of the Chinese domestic financial sector and 
on-shore bond markets, with attendant lib-
eralisation of capital and currency regimes. 
While the promotion of the financial sector 
is very much on the Chinese agenda, all the 
signs are this will be furthered in a gradual 
and cautious manner. In addition, develop-
ments will continue to be weighed against 
other priorities, particularly the re-balancing 
of the economy. Indeed, it is difficult to envis-
age a situation under which China would 
be prepared to significantly liberalise the 
currency and the capital regimes until satis-
fied that this will not have adverse impacts 
on the domestic economy. However much 
importance the Chinese authorities attach to 
the internationalisation of the Rmb, domestic 
conditions and priorities would be expected 
to remain the first consideration. This would 
suggest that both the ambitions for the finan-
cial sector and the internationalisation of the 
currency will continue to be limited to what 
can be achieved without significant liberalisa-
tion. Certainly, the prediction that the Rmb 
will become fully convertible and the capital 
account significantly liberalised by 2018 
(HSBC 2013), would seem to be extremely 
optimistic. Similarly, the Rmb is unlikely to 
significantly impinge on the position of the 
US$ outside of trade settlements until well 
beyond 2018. However, unless some major 
event truncates China’s economic rise, the 
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Rmb is set to become a major world currency, 
with its use reflecting China’s global position, 
and as such significantly displace the US$. 
The question is one of when rather than if.
Notes 
[1] Given the slowing of the growth of 
Chinese trade and GDP, the appreciation 
may slow and even reverse - though it 
should be stressed that the general view 
is that the Rmb is now little overvalued 
compared to the US$ - something the 
USA continues to deny (HSCB 2013: 1).
[2] See for example the key requirements 
for currency internationalisation sum-
marised in Chinn and Frankel (2005) 
and Pollard (2001: 18-19).
[3] It also reflects a lack of confidence in 
stocks - the Dow-Jones fell sharply in the 
wake of the loss of the loss of the triple A 
rating, as funds move to the safer haven 
of the treasury bills (Blyth 2013: 3).
[4] Indeed, the level of domination of the 
global system exhibited by the USA and its 
currency since the middle of the 20th cen-
tury is unprecedented. Earlier periods being 
significantly more multi-currency and power 
diffused. This was even the case during the 
height of Sterling and UK power. Thus, one 
should be careful in assuming that because 
the UK’s loss of lead economic and financial 
position was followed by a very rapid eclipse 
of its currency by the US$ (Eichengreen 2011: 
30-33; ECB 2012: 49-41), a similar rapid transi-
tion with take place with respect to the USA. 
[5] Amongst an enormous literature see 
Eichengreen (2011) on the US$ and Cox (2012) 
on declinism. Though on the latter, see also 
Cox (2007) and the rebuttal by Williams (2007).
[6] One indicator of this is the amount of note 
issue held or circulating offshore. For the US$ 
this is 50% of the issue (US$600bn.) com-
pared to 13% for the Euro (US$150bn; ECB 
2012: 20; Goldberg 2010; US Treasury 2012).
[7] When the present exceptional ascendency  
of the US$ emerged (late-1940s) the USA was  
the world’s largest creditor (between 1950 
and 1980 accounting for 85% of FDI), an 
exceptionally rapidly growing and dynamic 
‘global’ economy and the world’s largest 
single trader. The loss of these positions, 
particularly with respect to share of glo-
bal FDI falling to 20% and becoming the 
world’s largest debtor, has been reinforced 
by the present crisis to significantly reignite 
the debate over American declinism. 
[8] In 2010 approximately half of the world’s 
currencies and the economies involved (89) 
were linked directly to the US$, accounting 
for 35% of global GDP (Goldberg 2011: 23).
[9] See amongst an extensive literature: Chan-
drasekhar 2010; Eichengreen 2011: 121-126; 
Goldberg 2010; Lim 2006; WTO 2012: 3-8.
[10] See the overview of these by 
Eichengreen (2011: 126-130).
[11] Amongst an enormous literature see for 
example: Chinn and Frankel (2005). Such 
predictions have under-estimated the strength 
of the Dollar’s international position, and 
over-estimated the strengths of the Euro. On 
the weaknesses of the latter as an international 
currency see Eichengreen (2011: 130-133). 
  
[12] There were some significant revisions to 
the IMF’s methodology which particularly 
affected the Euro - notably the 28% upward 
revisions of the reserves in 2001 (IMF 2003, 
2012: 5 note 3). While between Q1 2002 and 
Q3 2007 the US$ depreciated 39% against 
the Euro (Posen 2008: 83). More problematic 
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is the partial and changing nature of the 
IMF data-base. In 2001 allocated reserves 
comprised 76.6% of the reserves of the 120 
countries that reported and were considered 
sufficiently reliable to be included. While 
in 2012, 145 countries were included, they 
only allocated 54.7% of their reserves (Kohler 
2012). The IMF does not release the names 
of the countries that are included, but it is 
believed that some very significant hold-
ers of reserves, particularly of US$ are not 
include, notably in Asia, where China does 
not report the composition of its reserves to 
the IMF and Taiwan is not a member (ECB 
2006: 10 Note 15; Otero-Iglesias 2011).
[13] Between 1993 and 1996 the US$ share 
of reserves was a very consistent 56.6%. 
Neither this, or the other qualifications, 
were stressed in my earlier comments 
on the shift away from the US$ as a 
reserve currency (see Dixon 2010: 8).
  
[14] For the EU despite some significant 
efforts by the ESCB (European System of Cen-
tral Banks), data on trade settlement remains 
extremely poor with significant gaps in the 
coverage (even for France and Germany), and 
heavy dependence on sample surveys and 
estimates (ECB 2009: 36; Otero-Iglesias (2011). 
    
[15] Now the best and most (but not fully) 
comprehensive  indication of the use of 
currencies in trade is provided by SWIFT 
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication; Anboin 2012: 9).  
[16] Use of the Euro and US$ 
in trade settlements:
 
Source Kamps: (2006: 18, 22, 43-47).
[17] This compares to 3.9 in the imme-
diate pre-Euro period when the ratio 
for the German Mark was 1.4, French 
Franc 1.0, Italian Lira 0.8 and the Neth-
erlands Guilder 0.9 (Pollard 2001: 29). 
[18] The Euro accounted for 10.4% 
of settlements but this was entirely 
restricted to trade with the EU.
[19] For an analysis of this production sys-
tem see WTO and IDE-JETRO (2011).
[20] These had been established since the 
1997 Asian regional crisis as part of the 
development of financial safely nets. 
[21] As was noted in Section 2, the shift 
away from the use of the US$ in reserves 
has been significantly more marked in the 
emergent and developing economies.
[22] Expression of such discontents goes back 
to at least the 1960s and have been repeat-
edly reinforced by the manner in which 
the USA has used its financial position to 
pursue many of its wider policy objectives.
[23] For more details of the agreements 
and overall strategy see Auboin (2012: 
15), HSBC (2013) and Subacchi (2010). 
[24] In 2012 Russian-Chinese trade was 
US$88bn, almost entirely dominated in US$. 
While 42.1 % of Japanese manufacturing 
exports to China were invoiced in US$, 48.1% 
in Yen and 1.3% in Rmb (Ito et al 2013: 8).
[25] This is an area in which the EU has 
been conspicuously poor in address-
ing with respect to the Euro. 
[26] Other countries that had announced 
that they were holding reserves in Rmb 
included (in order of announcement): 
Malaysia, South Korea, Nigeria,  Chile, 
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Venezuela, Japan and Indonesia, Belarus, 
Taiwan and Thailand (BBVA 2013).
[27] Within Asia these included Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and more 
broadly, Argentina, Australia, Belarus Brazil, 
Iceland, Kazakhstan, New Zealand Turkey, 
France, UAR, Uzbekistan, UK, and Ukraine.
[28] BBVA (2013) suggest an even steeper  
rise to 15.6% in June 2013 and 16.8% by  
September.
  
[29] According to SWIFT (2013a, 2013b) 
the share of the Rmb in trade settlements 
increased from 0.25% in January 2012, to 
0.53% in August, 0.63% in January 2013, 
0.69% in April, and 0.84% in May, with the 
immediate prospect of challenging the Nor-
wegian Kroner (0.86%) and the HK$ (0.97%).
[30] In the past the USA is believed to have 
exerted diplomatic pressure on countries to 
maintain US$ use, not least with respect to 
Japan in the 1980s and more recently for oil 
pricing. Some go further, seeing moves away 
from the US$ (or threats to do so) as a signifi-
cant element in the imposition of sanctions 
against Iran and even the invasion of Iraq. 
[31] It is certainly the case that countries other 
than China wish to reduce US$ dependence 
and see greater use of their own curren-
cies – most significantly Russia, India and 
Brazil. Ambitions that are also reflected in 
some general moves to use local currencies in 
cross border trade, rather than ‘third’ curren-
cies’ – notably in Asia and South America. 
Thus, the hegemony of the US$ may be 
replaced by a more diverse currency situation 
involving a significant degree of currency 
regionalisation (see World Economic Forum 
2012). Indeed, the size of the contemporary 
global economy gives ample space for the 
operation of a number of major currencies 
(see for example Eichengreen 2011: 151-152). 
[32] In 2012 95.5% of USA trade with China  
was settled in US$ and the use of the 
Rmb was declining with both US offi-
cials and firms unprepared to switch 
away from dollar payments (see for 
example Ye Xie 2013; SWIFT 2013a). 
[33] This would seem to be very largely a 
matter of prestige, for reduced use of the 
US$ in third country trade would have 
little real impact on the economy of the 
USA (see for example Goldberg 2011).
[34] See list of emotive US headlines in ‘China 
takes another stab at the dollar, launches 
currency swap line with France’, posted by 
Tyler Durden on 04/13/2013 at ‘China takes 
another stab at http://www.zerohedge.com/
news/2013-04-13/china-takes-another-stab-
dollar-launches-currency-swap-line-france
[35] The whole situation could of course 
change if there was some major collapse of 
confidence in the USA’s currency and  
bond markets. 
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Tables
Table 1: Currency use and export share (%)
Notes: [1} SWIFT (2013b) - this represents a decline-
from a Euro peak of 44% in January 2012 and a US$ 
low of 29.7%; [2] IMF (2013a); [3] ECB (2013: 28) - the 
figures add to 200%; [4] BIS (2013); [5] World Bank 
(2013), Eurostat 2013; [6] EU figure in bracket, both 
include intra-trade (Eurozone 13.3%, EU 23.2%); [7] 
The IMF does not yet provide a separate total for 
the Rmb, lumping it with the 2.9% not held in the 
top 11 currencies - but it seems unlikely that more 
than 0.5% of reserves are currently held in Rmb.
Table 2: International roles of the US$  
and Euro (%)
Notes: [1] 1998; [2] 1998 Euro legacy currencies, of which 
the German Mark comprised 30.1% and the French Franc 
5.1%; [3] the introduction of the Euro saw a major fall in  
foreign exchange transactions; [4] 2013.
Sources: BIS (1999, 2002, 2011, 2013); Cohen (2005);  
ECB (2012: 17, 2013: 28); IMF (2013).
Table 3: The invoicing currencies of Japanese 
manufacturing exports (%)
Source: compiled from Ito et al (2013: 8-12) based on a 
2009 survey.
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